Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Autor/innen

  • Ola Anderson
  • Matteo M. Galizzi
  • Tim Hoppe
  • Sebastian Kranz
  • Karen van der Wiel
  • Erik Wengström

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24352/UB.OVGU-2018-361

Schlagworte:

Communication in Games, Cheap Talk

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

Veröffentlicht

2018-09-04

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