The Impact of Information Sharing on Supply Chain Performance in Case of Asymmetric Information
Schlagworte:experimental economics, screening contracts, supply chain coordination
The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One major assumption in this context is that subjects will rather use their private information strategically than to reveal them truthfully, if they do not get any incentives to do this. This harms supply chain performance. This paper investigates the influence of costless pre-game communication (i.e. communication without any direct incentives) between a supplier and a buyer in a lotsizing framework. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test, whether this costless pre-game communication has (in contradiction to standard game-theory) an influence on supply chain coordination.
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