Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values

Authors

  • Sascha Füllbrunn

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24352/UB.OVGU-2018-351

Keywords:

auctions, electronic markets, experiments

Abstract

The Hard Close auction has become a familiar auction format in online markets and in a private value framework this dynamic second-price auction format has experimentally been tested in recent studies. Considering a common value framework, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) demonstrate that in the Hard Close auction format bidders, using a sniping strategy, do not provide information during the auction. We provide contrary results from a laboratory experiment. Bidders provide information during the bidding process, resulting in different bid functions that depend on the bidders private information rank.

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Published

2018-09-04

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Section

Artikel