Corporate tax incidence and tax avoidance

evidence from the German business tax reform 2008

Abstract

This study examines the interplay between corporate tax avoidance and the incidence of the corporate income tax falling on wages and employment. Using the German Business Tax Reform 2008 (GBTR 2008) as a natural experiment, we investigate how a large tax cut of about nine percentage points affected wages and the number of employees of low-avoidance firms compared with high-avoidance firms. We expect an abnormal wage response of low-avoidance firms that are more burdened by corporate taxation and benefitted more from the tax cut. In difference-in-differences and triple-difference regressions, we do not find significant evidence for an abnormal wage response of low-avoidance firms. A potential explanation might be strong labour protection regulations in Germany that might limit the ability of German firms to shift corporate taxes on labour. We find some but not very robust evidence for an abnormal increase in employment of low-avoidance firms after the GBTR 2008. Our findings align with recent evidence that German employees bear only a small fraction of German corporate taxation and that this burden primarily falls on employees of very small firms that are only poorly represented in our Amadeus data.