Equilibrium Selection and Simple Signaling Games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24352/UB.OVGU-2018-563Keywords:
Noncooperative Game Theory, Signaling Games, Equilibrium Selec-tion, Harsanyi-Selten theory, Risk Dominance, Tracing ProcedureAbstract
This paper calculates the Harsanyi-Selten solutions for a class of simple signaling games. This means that for each generic game belonging to this class one of its equilibrium points is selected according to the principles developed by John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Harsanyi & Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, 1988). For almost fifty years signaling games have been of great interest for both normative game theorists and scientists in-terested in the analysis of social, cultural and biological phenomena. The paper provides an introduction into the Harsanyi-Selten theory, solves all generic games and subsumes the results. Thus comparisons to Nash refinement concepts can easily be done and the solution of more complex games is facilitated.
